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Abstract— In ubiquitous computing domain context awareness 
is an important issue. So, in ubiquitous computing, mere 
protection of message confidentiality is not sufficient for most 
of the applications where context-awareness can lead to near 
deterministic ideas. An adversary might deduce sensitive 
information by observing the contextual data, which when 
correlated with prior information about the people and the 
physical locations that are being monitored by a set of sensors 
can reveal most of the sensitive information. So, it is obvious 
that for security and privacy preservation in ubiquitous 
computing context protection is of equal importance. In this 
paper, we propose a scheme which provides two layer privacy 
protection of user’s or application’s context data. Our 
proposed context protecting privacy preservation scheme 
focuses on protecting spatial and temporal contextual 
information. We consider the communication part of 
ubiquitous computing consists of tiny sensor nodes forming 
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs). Through simulation we 
show the efficacy of our scheme. We also demonstrate the 
capability of our scheme to overcome the constraints of WSNs.  
Keywords-ubiquitous computing; context-awareness; privacy 
preservation; key management;  
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Ubiquitous computing enhances computer use by making 
many computers available throughout the physical 
environment, while making them effectively invisible to the 
user. This requires functioning of multitude of devices in the 
environment to be oblivious to the users. Mark Weiser in his 
paper “The Computer for the Twenty-First Century” defines 
ubiquitous computing as a technology that “weave itself into 
the fabric of everyday life until it is indistinguishable from 
the it” [1]. This point of view leads to the notion that almost 
everything in the fabric of ubiquity points to context-
awareness.  Context-awareness evolved from the idea to 
express the ability of systems and components to respond to 
the situation of the user that interacted with this system. 
Research in context-aware computing has made numerous 
attempts to model not only human attributes and behavior 
but also how we relate to our environment [2]. Ubiquitous 
applications requires continuous monitoring, gathers vast 
amounts of sensitive electronic information about the users, 
which is the basis of finding opportunities for data 
interception, theft and surveillance. For example, the 
disclosure of both spatial and temporal data through traffic 
analysis, may allow tracking the relative or actual 
information through correlation with prior knowledge. With 
so much retrievable personal information available through 
Internet, it is now becoming difficult and challenging to 
protect privacy. Good amount of research effort has been 
gone into the research of privacy preservation, particularly 
in ubiquitous domain, where distributed computing poses a 
great threat. In [3], it is observed that ubiquitous computing 
environments require security and privacy architecture 
based on trust rather than just user authentication and access 
control. Burnside et al. [4] described a resource discovery 
and communication system designed for security and 
privacy.  
So, we can observe that along with user privacy 
protection by hiding users’ identity or location, we require 
to protect data privacy. In a privacy-preserving data 
aggregation (PPDA) protocol, sensor data are partially 
exposed to neighboring trusted sensor nodes so that data 
aggregation can be achieved on the way to the source node 
without revealing the actual data to the trusted sensor nodes 
or adversaries [5-7]. In his famous paper [8], Yao has 
introduces the millionaire problem, which can be 
summarized as:  A and B are two millionaires who want to 
find out who is richer without revealing the precise amount 
of their wealth. The objective of privacy preserving data 
mining is to meet the required privacy requirements and to 
provide data mining outcome [9]. There are number of 
research proposals and algorithms exist for solving the 
stated problem. In [10], the problem of privacy preservation 
in a peer-to-peer network application is addressed. In [11], 
Wenbo He et.al. propose schemes to achieve data 
aggregation while preserving privacy. The scheme they 
proposed, CPDA (Cluster-based Private Data Aggregation) 
performs privacy-preserving data aggregation in low 
communication overhead with high computational 
overhead. In CPDA, each cluster leverages the additive 
property of polynomials to calculate the desired aggregate 
value.  
From this background, we propose our context protecting 
privacy preservation scheme. This scheme has two layers. In 
first layer, the contextual information derived from spatial 
and temporal domain identity of the user is protected. In 
second layer, the actual contextual data privacy protection is 
made using the concept of PPDA. 
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The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we 
illustrate the system architecture.  In Section 3, we present 
first layer of our scheme, where location and timing data 
privacy is protected. In Section 4, we describe the privacy 
preservation method of the contextual data itself by using 
PPDA.  In Section 5, we present the simulation result and 
analysis. Lastly, we conclude the paper in Section 6 with 
conclusion and future scope of work. 
. 
II. SYSTEM MODEL 
 
In this section, we illustrate the system model, based on 
which our context protecting privacy preservation scheme is 
based. We consider N number of sensor nodes are present in 
the distributed network, which is a part of overall ubiquitous 
computing system. We take Home Gateway (HG) as the 
central server which is connected to the Internet. The sensor 
nodes are bi-directional and they have single-hop (direct) or 
multi-hop link with the HG in order to maintain connectivity 
with the outside world. For illustration purpose we have 
taken N= 8.  This is shown in Fig.1. 
 
Figure 1. Home Gateway based ubiquitous computing architecture 
 
The objective of our scheme is that the contextual 
information regarding any of the sensor nodes  ,    
need to be protected. These information are 	 ,  , which 
are for spatial and temporal identity of the nodes. Apart from 
that it is required that even in the case these data are revealed 
to an attacker, he/she cannot make out the content of the 
data. This is in fact, a doubly locked privacy preservation 
scheme, where both the locks (schemes) are independent. 
From functional point of view, contextual data has two parts. 
First part, it is being made anonymous so that even in the 
case actual data is revealed, source or destination turns out to 
be vague. The second part consists of preserving the privacy 
of the actual data itself by data perturbation technique so that 
attacker gets confused. This is shown in Fig. 2. Our proposed 
scheme enables users to control their personal data. If the 
user does not require concealing its contextual information, 
then the system bypasses the scheme and directly delivers 
the information in traditional way. But in the case, the user 
wants its contextual data to be privacy protected; the user 
needs to inform the system about the amount of protection it 
requires. If only anonymity is sufficient, then second layer is 
ignored. If data privacy preservation or data perturbation 
based PPDA is required then first layer is bypassed. If the 
user wants absolute privacy protection, then both the layers 
are used for its contextual data protection. This algorithm is 
shown in Fig. 3.   
 
Figure 2. Functional model 
III. ANONYMITY OF CONTEXTUAL INFORMATION 
 
In this section, we propose our scheme of contextual data 
privacy protection by anonymity. In this case, we consider 
only spatial and temporal privacy. We would like to remark 
that the classification of context-oriented privacy into the 
two categories of spatial and temporal privacy only reflects 
the current state-of-the art, and should not be treated as a 
comprehensive classification. In order to illustrate this, we 
present our scheme for location privacy, which can be 
extended to temporal privacy by slight modification. 
In order to conceal the location or spatial information of a 
node, we need to protect the poor privacy protection 
performance of conventional routing protocols. To achieve 
our objective of location privacy protection, we consider the 
phantom routing strategy [12]. In this scheme, the source 
location privacy is protected through directing the periodic 
messages from the source node towards different paths in the 
network. This prohibits the malicious nodes or the attacker 
from receiving a stable stream of messages that would enable 
back-tracing the source. Instead of that, by the received 
messages the attacker is led towards phantom sources. This 
routing strategy is depicted in Fig. 4. In this scheme, there 
are two phases exist for packet delivery. First one, which 
originates from the source (S) is a pure or directed random 
walk for a given number of hops that directs the message to a 
phantom source or flooding source F away from the original 
source S. The second phase, which is message flooding 
phase delivers the message to the destination D. In this case 
random walk at the first phase leads to different flooding 
node, which makes tracing back more difficult. If the 
malicious node M detects a message forwarded by node F 
and moves to that node to get closer to the source, the next 
message is unlikely to follow the same random path. This 
makes M's previous move worthless. For more protection, 
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we can apply greedy random walk approach, which is a two 
way random walk, performed both from the source and the 
source. It is inspired by the observation that if M gains a 
good coverage of the network by distributing a number of 
observation points around the source, the source location 
could be approximated because the flooding phase would 
reveal too much information. In order to avoid this, instead 
of using flooding to deliver the message to the destination D, 
the destination node sets up a random walk which serves as 
the receptor of the messages. Each message is randomly 
forwarded from a source until it reaches the receptor, and is 
then forwarded to the destination through the pre-established 
path. A further advantage that the random walk offers is that 
the safety period improves as the network size increases, as 
the paths followed by subsequent messages, and 
consequently the malicious nodes, become more diverse. The 
diversity of the paths is not, however, the only issue that the 
random walk implementation needs to ensure. The main 
purpose of this phase is to send each message to a phantom 
source that is far from the original source. The second 
problem is finding the flooding zone such that it is as 
minimum (with respect to number nodes message needs to 
be flooded to) as possible which will make trace back low 
probabilistic. Finding this optimality condition can be 
explained by an example. 
Let, probability of original source detection be  , which 
is a very small number ,    0. Typically,   10. In 
order to find the destination (assuming that our first phase 
has been broken. Source S and flooding node F are 
identified) D, the attacker has to try out each of the flooded 
message from F. Now, if N number of nodes are available in 
the flooding zone and average H number of hops possible in 
that zone, then message is broadcast to K number of nodes, 
where 
   
!
!   !
 
So, finding S from K possible nodes is of probability: 
1/K. So, the optimal condition is: 
 
  
1

     
1

  
Now, let us consider it numerically for practical case. 
Consider, 
  10

 
   3 
N turns out to be = 10 to satisfy the condition:    

.  
This is very nominal. In the case the average hop number 
is 4, N is approximately 8. So, we observe that, very low 
probability of trace-back condition can be achieved with few 
numbers of nodes selected in the flooding zone. The 
proposed scheme when compared to basic flooding, the 
energy consumption, which mainly depends on the number 
of the transmitted messages, is not increased. The message 
latency, however, could be significantly increased depending 
on the length of the random walk. This may not be a problem 
as most of the current day’s privacy preservation applications 
are non real-time in nature.  
 
Figure 3. Functional model 
 
Figure 4. Context anonymity routing 
 
IV. PERTURBATION OF CONTEXTUAL INFORMATION 
 
In this section, we present the scheme for privacy 
preservation of user data. The objective is similar that of [8], 
i.e., we consider a scenario where data aggregation needs to 
be done in privacy-preserved way for distributed computing 
platform. There are number of data sources which collect or 
produce data. The data collected or produced by the sources 
is private and the owner or the source does not like to reveal 
the content of the data. But the collected data from the source 
is to be aggregated by an aggregator, which may be a third 
party or part of the network, where the data sources belong. 
The data sources do not trust the aggregator. So the data 
needs to be secure and privacy protected. In tune of that, we 
propose a scheme which is secure and privacy preserved. 
The computation for the aggregation is based on the concept 
of Secure Multiparty Computation (SMC) [13]. In this case, 
we need to slightly modify the routing process initialization 
from the source. Instead of one, we consider two sources (S1 
and S2) and one Aggregator-Forwarder (AF) node, where the 
data of the source nodes will aggregate.  The AF node 
aggregates the data of S1 and S2 and forwards the 
aggregated value towards the Flooding node. Aggregation 
process is governed by data perturbation technique, where 
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the AF cannot find out the exact content of the data of S1 
and S2. This is depicted in Fig. 5. Here, we follow the 
scheme proposed in [7] by He et al. The scheme they 
proposed, CPDA (Cluster-based Private Data Aggregation) 
performs privacy-preserving data aggregation in low 
communication overhead with high computational overhead. 
They have assumed a self-organized multi-hop wireless 
sensor networks. The scheme CPDA though very much 
effective, but suffers from two critical limitations: 
1. Computation of the privacy preservation algorithm 
increases exponentially with the number of source 
nodes. In fact, its computational complexity is O(N2), 
where N= number of nodes.  
2. In most of the practical scenarios, the source nodes 
cannot communicate directly with each other or peer-
to-peer. In these cases, CPDA is useless. 
 
 
Figure 5. Privacy routing 
 
Our proposed scheme consists of three parts: 
1. Key management 
2. Data value distortion 
3. Data aggregation 
A. Key Management: 
In order to accomplish these objectives, we first form 
cluster of the source nodes. Let, there be N number of source 
nodes and each cluster consists of n number of source nodes. 
So, there will be N/n number of clusters. The key 
management process starts by key pre-distribution stage. In 
the pre-distribution phase, a large key-pool of K keys and 
corresponding identities are generated. These K number of 
keys are divided into two banks. One bank consists of k 
number of keys, which is used for source node’s 
communication with AF. The rest K-k number of keys form 
another bank which are required for communication between 
S1 and S2 via aggregator node. So, the key management 
scheme consists of two parts: 
 
Source to AF: Each source node has K-k number of keys 
shared with AF. As, all the source nodes possess the same 
keys, it is totally unsecure when a source node 
communicates with AF node with the shared key. Any 
malicious source node can decipher the source nodes’ 
communication with AF and can launch attack very easily. 
In order to avoid this, in the pre-distribution phase, the 
source-AF key bank is randomly permuted and reordered for 
each source-AF pair. This ordering of the key bank is stored 
in the AF for each source. Now, the source node 
communicates with AF through one of its shared keys. To 
accomplish this action, the source node first generates a 
random number between 1 and K-k. This random number 
(Rc) is sent to AF in plain text. AF understands that the 
source node will encrypt the next message by the Rcth 
number key of the key bank.  
 
Source to Source (S1 to S2): It is assumed that source to 
source direct communication does not exist and this has to 
happen securely through AF. In order to achieve that, the k 
number of keys are stored in the source nodes, which AF is 
unaware of. It is also a requirement that other source nodes 
should not decipher the message source 1 sends to source 2. 
As the k keys are same for all the source nodes, it becomes 
easy for another source node to decrypt the plain text, i.e. 
source 3 can decrypt what source node 1 and source node 2 
are communicating. To avoid this situation, source node 1 
and source node 2 separately permute the key bank order of 
the k number of keys dedicated for source-source 
communication and reorder that randomly. After that, they 
pass the permute function to each through AF using their 
pair-wise key with the AF. 
B. Data value distortion: 
Let the data values  at S1 and S2 be x and y,  z be the 
dummy variable at the aggregator (A). In the first step, the 
aggregator sends three seeds a,b and c to S1 and S2. Based 
on that A computes 
 
1
  ! " #1
 $ " #2
 $2 
2
  ! " #1
 & " #2
 &2 
 
  ! " #1
 ' " #2
 '2 
Where R1A and R2B are two random numbers generated by 
A. Similarly, S1 computes 
 
1
1  ( " #1
1& " #2
1&2 
 
1  ( " #1
1$ " #2
1$2 
2
1  ( " #1
1' " #2
1'2 
Similarly S2 computes 
 
 
2  ) " #1
2$ "  #2
2$2 
1
2  ) " #1
2& "  #2
2&2 
2
2  ) " #1
2' "  #2
2'2 
 
Where R1S1 and R2S1 are two random numbers generated 
by S1, R1S2 and R2S2 are two random numbers generated by 
S2. After that, the calculated, 1  and 2  are sent to S1 and 
S2 by A, securely as described earlier. Similarly, *+and ++ 
are sent to source node 2 and A by S1 and *+ and *+ and 
+
+
 are sent to A and S1 by S2. 
C. Data aggregation: 
After the private data values (x and y) are distorted, all 
the nodes aggregates the values available to them and 
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generates aggregated result. S1 calculates
 and A calculates  . 
 
 
Where, 
. These aggregated results from S1 and S
sent to the aggregator A. Now, the aggregator has the simple 
task to solve the above equation for (x+y+z) with the 
knowledge of the values of a,b,c and 
After solving for D = x+y+z, node A knows its data z, so it 
can find out the result (x+y). 
 
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
 
In this section, we show a comparative study between our 
proposed scheme and the CPDA scheme in [11].  The 
objective of our work is to find a simpler, efficient privacy 
preserved data aggregation scheme, which has scalability 
and can be highly effective in some practical scenario like 
discussed in the motivation section. From that perspective, 
we see that computation time requirement to run SPPDA 
comes out to be around 1 msec in an Intel Core 2 duo PC 
with CPU speed 3 GHz and RAM of 2 GB. Where
increase the number of source nodes to 3, the overall 
computation speed becomes 3 msec as shown in fig. 6. As in 
our scheme, in most cases, there will be fixed two number of 
source nodes, the computational time becomes fixed. This is 
indeed a necessary requirement if the overall system is real
time in nature and for resource limited sensor nodes in WSN. 
In CPDA scheme, there exists certain probability where 
private data may be disclosed. This can only happen wh
the source nodes exchange messages within the cluster. This 
can be estimated as: 
Where Dmax = maximum cluster size, pc = minimum 
cluster size (= 3, two source nodes and one aggregator), k = 
cluster size, b = probability that link level privacy is broken, 
P(k=m) = probability that a cluster size is m. In our case, pc 
= Dmax = k = 3, P(k=m) =1. So, we have plotted P(b) for 
CPDA and our scheme in fig. 7. It is observed that the 
probability of privacy compromised in CPDA has much 
steeper slope.   
In CPDA, a requirement is that a pair of source nodes 
possessing same pair of keys, where the keys are ta
randomly from a large pool of key, should be high. 
Otherwise, the scheme cannot work. But, this requirement 
helps malicious nodes to capture at least some of the 
communication, if it has common pair of keys. This 
probability also increases with number of source nodes 
increase when total number of keys in the key pool is 
constant. In our scheme, there is no requirement like that. 
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Figure. 6. Computation time requirement
 
 
 
Figure. 7. Probability of private data disclosure
 
VI. CONCLUSION
 
In this paper, we proposed a scheme which aims to 
protect the privacy of the contextual data mainly in 
ubiquitous computing environment. It is a two
and user has the choice of opting for none, both or any of the 
tiers as per its security and privacy requirem
growing number of ubiquitous applications like Home 
Gateways developed, it becomes very important to conceal 
one’s contextual information, which indirectly can 
destabilize the security policies. Our scheme, in that sense is 
a very important development. Our future work will mainly 
focus on the complexity analysis and actual implementation 
in real test-bed. 
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